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NuMBER 1

REFLECTIONS ON COERCED EXPRESSION
Robert D. Kamenshine"
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1943, during the Second World War, patriotism was at a peak.
However, the Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Barnette,, held that
the First Amendment barred the government from requiring public school
students to salute the flag, that is, to "communicate [their] acceptance of...

political ideas" and to "utter what was not in their minds." Justice Jackson's
opinion cited the experience of "the [e]arly Christians [who] were... persecuted for their refusal to participate in ceremonies before the statue of the
emperor .

. . .", Similarly,

on the holiest day of the Jewish religious calen-

dar, Yom Kippur, a meditation speaks "of a people... forced to say what
with... [their] forethey do not mean.", Worshipers are asked to "identify
4
bearers who had to say 'yes' when they meant 'no.'

* E. George Rudolph Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law,
1997-98; Attorney, United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Staff.; B.A. 1961,
College of the City of New York; J.D. 1964, Columbia Law School; LL.M. 1967, Harvard Law School.
The following article is a footnoted and updated version of the E. George Rudolph lecture, delivered by the author on April 22, 1998, at the University of Wyoming College of Law. The author deeply
appreciates the opportunity to have been the first occupant of the E. George Rudolph Chair and thanks
the administration, faculty, staff, and students for a memorable and rewarding year.
The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not necessarily coincide with those of
the United States Department of Justice.
1. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2. Id at 633 n.13.
3. CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABIS, GATES OF REPENTANCE 250 (1978).
4. Id.
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In Barnette, as in these historical antecedents, government had directed
human beings to express, by mouth and/or by a communicative physical act,
a defined political or religious viewpoint. But the contemporary settings of
coerced expression are generally less dramatic and more complex., This
discussion offers a brief overview of this important area of First Amendment law and proposes an expansive and strict application of the anticoerced expression principle.
Current controversies often involve measures intended to further First
Amendment values by adding new voices to the marketplace of ideas or
enhancing the ability of certain "speakers" to reach their audience. One
party is compelled to subsidize or facilitate the speech of another, rather
than literally to speak. The coerced party may be a corporation, a legal construct not itself possessing a human will. The beneficiary of the compulsion
may also be a corporation, or the government itself. The Supreme Court has
noted that such enhancements may simultaneously diminish another's First
Amendment rights., For example, government subsidization of the arts may
increase the quantity, quality, and diversity of artistic expression, but at the
expense of objecting taxpayers.

When does the First Amendment bar government from compelling a
private party, human or corporate, to subsidize or facilitate the expression of
another party, or of the government? Government collects taxes to fund its
own speech7 and to subsidize private expression.' Government also compels
direct subsidization of private expression, for example, by requiring payments to labor unions and integrated bars.' In other cases, a party may be
compelled solely to facilitate another's speech, for example, by providing
air time on television on a fair-compensation basis. 0
There are still other variables. The compulsion, such as requiring cable
companies to lease channels," may involve expression that, unlike the flag
salute, has no expressly defined content or viewpoint. Unlike the complainants in Barnette, the coerced party may well support, or at least be neutral as
to, the viewpoint or content of the compelled expression. The party may
5. See Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy; The Supreme Court Struggles To

-ProtectIntellectualIndividualism, 64 TEx. L. REv. 817 (1986) (tracing developments since Barnette).
6. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974); Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 4849(1976).
7. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991).

8. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
9. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (labor union); Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1 (1990) (integrated bar).
10. For example, under 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994), broadcast licensees must allow "a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office.., reasonable access to or permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station.. on behalf of his candidacy."
1I. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1994).
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simply object to the compulsion per se. Again, unlike the complainants in
Barnette, the coerced party, like a cable operator, may not be personally
identified with the coerced expression. Further, the compulsion may not
relate to political or religious expression, but to artistic, or commercial expression. Finally, the coerced party may have received a related government

benefit, for example, a radio or television broadcasting license to use part of
the "publicly-owned" electromagnetic spectrum.
II. GOVERNMENT

USES TAX DOLLARS TO SPEAK OR TO SUBSIDIZE PRIVATE
ExPREsSION

A. Tax Dollarsto Fund Government Expression

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment generally prohibits
utilizing taxes to fund religious speech by the government.'2 Given this prohibition, there is little need to consider, under the Amendment's Free Exer-

cise Clause, any theoretical right of dissenting taxpayers to a proportionate
reduction of their taxes. Outside the realm of religion, however, the situation is different.
Absent a corresponding express prohibition of "political establishment" that would forbid the dissemination of a political viewpoint by the
government qua government, the extent, if any, to which the First Amendment similarly may constrain non-religious government speech is
uncertain." In fact, the Supreme Court has emphasized that there is a considerable latitude for government speech." The rationale has been that such
speech: (1) facilitates public debate and is thus an integral part of the demo-

12. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984)
(sustaining municipality's display of a creche as part of annual Christmas display, but emphasizing
display's overall non-religious character). In Marsh v.Chambers, the Court sustained the employment of
a chaplain by a state legislature to provide opening prayers, but did not decide the validity of funding
their publication. 463 U.S. 783, 785 n.3 (1983).
13. See RODNEY SMOLLA & MELVIN NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST

AMENDMENT §10.03 (1994); Robert D. Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L.REV. 1104 (1979).
14. See Rosenberger v.Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what
it wishes"); Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 2130, 2144 n2 (1997) (Souter J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the government may have greater latitude in selecting content than otherwise
permissible under the First Amendment"); Keller, 496 U.S. at 10-13 (emphasizing that the speech of the
state bar on political issues was not that of the government); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)
(assuming that New Hampshire was entitled to disseminate the state's slogan, although not necessarily
that dissenting taxpayers had no right to "opt-out"). But see Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 854 (1982) (possible First Amendment constraints on government's role as
elementary and secondary school educator ); National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct.
2168, 2184 n.3 (1998) (Scalia J., concurring) (assuming, on non-First Amendment grounds, that "it
would be... unconstitutional for the government itself to promote candidates nominated by the Republican Party").
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cratic process, and (2) reflects the outcome of that process in that a majority
of voters has sanctioned the advancement of certain policies."
Moreover, unlike the case where an objecting party's payments are
used to fund the political speech of an organization, such as a union, where
the party is entitled to appropriate relief from such an exaction," it has been

assumed that an objecting taxpayer may not obtain similar relief where he
or she objects to tax dollars funding government political speech." Significantly, the democratic process required for the internal governance of a labor union or an integrated bar has not deterred the Court from holding that
dissenting members have a First Amendment right to relief where their dues
are used to fund political speech.
B. Tax Dollars to Fund PrivateExpression

The Establishment Clause generally bars the use of taxes to fund private religious speech. 18 Thus, government subsidization of private artistic
expression, arguably "pro" or "anti-religious" in viewpoint, conceivably

might trigger a problem under that provision. Certainly the funding of a
piece of religious art differs from the valid exhibition of a religiouslythemed work of art at a government owned museum, such as the National
Gallery of Art.,, Of course, the meaning of any artistic work is debatable.
15. In Keller, the Court stated that
[g]overnment officials are expected as part of the democratic process to represent
and to espouse the views of a majority of their constituents. . . . If every citizen
were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public express a view with which
he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to
those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it would be
radically transformed.
496 U.S. at 12-13. In Abood, Justice Powell's concurrence observed that "the reason for permitting the
government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the
government is the representative of the people" (emphasis supplied). Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977). Of course, the undisputed duty of elected officials and appointed policy
makers to address issues of public concern is unrelated to the creation of institutional programs designed
to influence public opinion.
16. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline,
and Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 44345 (1984).
17. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 12 (emphasizing that for constitutional purposes the integrated bar was
not "the government," so that members had First Amendment right to object). There are questions of
whether there is any constitutional protection afforded an unwilling taxpayer, and, assuming such protection, whether such a taxpayer would have standing to seek relief. Of course, even more so than in the
case of labor unions and integrated bars, the pro rata amount involved would be even more minuscule.
But see Hudson, 475 U.S. at 305 ("whatever the amount, the quality of respondents' interest in not being
compelled to subsidize the propagation of political or ideological views that they oppose is clear") (citingAbood, 431 U.S. at 235)).
18. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
19. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984) (noting in the course of sustaining a municipality's display of its creche as part of larger Christmas display that "[a]rt galleries supported by public
revenues display religious paintings of the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith").
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Moreover, if the standard by which the art is funded is religiously neutral,
and some of the art happens to involve a religious theme chosen by the artist, any establishment problem is minimized."
The guarantee of freedom of speech may also limit the standards that
the government applies to determine which private artistic expression to
subsidize. In National Endowment For The Arts v. Finley," the Court sustained the provision of federal law that required the National Endowment
for the Arts (NEA) to "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public,"2 but only, in the words of Justice Scalia, "by gutting it."' 3 Many artists
and others viewed the "decency" standard as censorial. Many taxpayers,
however, objected, on various grounds, to their taxes being used to subsidize certain projects. To the extent that a First Amendment problem remains
as to the government allegedly regulating artistic expression by effective
standards governing which expression to subsidize, an equally significant
problem remains with the government compelling objecting taxpayers to do
the subsidizing."
Again, to the extent that the government's funding of private expression is otherwise permissible, it has been assumed that objecting taxpayers
have no right to withhold their financial support. In Buckley v. Valeo," in
which the Court upheld the dollar check-off provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the objecting parties argued that, consistent
with the First Amendment, Congress must "permit taxpayers to designate
particular candidates or parties as recipients of their money."" The Court's

20. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840-41 (1995); Witters v.

Washington Dept. of Serv. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (upholding blind recipient's use of
vocational assistance to study for ministry at a Christian college); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
271-76 (1981) (no establishment problem in university's allowing student religious group to use facilities on equal basis with non-religious groups). In Frodyce v. Frohnmayer, 763 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C.
1991), the plaintiffs-taxpayers challenged the funding by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) of
an exhibition of allegedly anti-religious art. The court, however, held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
It emphasized that first, the plaintiffs, who claimed "offense to their religious sensibilities" had not
"even allege [d] that they ha[d] either seen the exhibition or studied the catalogue," and second, it was the
NEA, not Congress in the exercise of its spending power, that had allocated the funds. Id. at 656. The
court also noted that even if the plaintiffs were successful, this would not decrease the total amount to be
spent by the NEA. Id. at 657 n.4.
21. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
23. 118 S. Ct. at 2180. The Court construed the provision as one which first, embodied "advisory
language impos[ing] no categorical requirement," second, "admonishe[d] the NEA merely to take 'decency and respect' into consideration," and third, "aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding
speech." Id. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. See id. at 2185 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
26. Id. at 91. This ignores the point that some taxpayers might have chosen not to fund any political
speech.
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response was ambiguous. It first stated that the appropriation to fund the
presidential campaign was "like any other . . . from the general revenue,"
except that the amount was measured by the aggregate of the check-off.'

The Court then noted that "[t]he scheme involves no compulsion upon individuals to finance the dissemination of ideas with which they disagree.",,

But the Court more broadly concluded that "[t]he fallacy of [the challenger's] argument is ... apparent; every appropriation made by Congress
uses public money in a manner to which some taxpayers object."'" Most
recently, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,0

the Court held that a public university could not bar a student activities fund
from financially supporting a religiously oriented magazine. The Court
noted that "our decision cannot be read as addressing an expenditure from a
general tax fund.' Justice O'Connor's concurrence pointed out that because

the fund was "[u]nlike monies dispensed from state or federal treasuries,"
(that is, the funds were collected from the students,) there was an "opt-out
possibility not availableto citizens generally.",,
These assessments ignore the point that First Amendment values really

are at stake when the government funds private expression instead of, for
example, a disputed weapons system or public works project. When it is
expression, not hardware, that is at issue, reliance on the functioning of the
democratic process does not provide a comparable excuse for ignoring dissent. I continue to maintain that the First Amendment should be read to preclude government, as an institution, from using tax dollars to advance a

position on controversial political issues, whether directly or by subsidizing
private parties. Moreover, at least as a matter of theoretical consistency,
taxpayers would be entitled to the same dissenters' rights as the Court rec-

ognized in Abood.31 Uniformity of result should go in this direction, not, as
27. Id.
28. Id. at91 n.124.
29. Id. at 91-92. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 385 n.16 (1984) (invalidating
the prohibition on editorializing by public broadcasters).
30. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
31. Id. at841.
32. Id. at 851 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor explained that "the Student Activities Fund is
collected from students who themselves administer the fund and select qualifying recipients only from
among those who originally paid the fee."Id. She noted "the possibility that the student fee is susceptible
to a Free Speech clause challenge by an objecting student that she should not be compelled to pay for
speech with which she disagrees." id. (citations omitted). This possibility, she argued, "provide[d] a
potential basis for distinguishing proceeds of the student fees in this case from proceeds of the general
assessments in support of religion that lie at the core of the prohibition against religious funding... and
from government funds generally." Id, See also Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 732 (7th Cir. 1998).
33. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL Law §12-4 at 807 n.14 (1988). But see THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREssION 693 (1970) (noting that "[w]hile the individual
may have somewhat less freedom to express himself as a member of an association than as a general
citizen, he has correspondingly greater rights concerning the disposal of his contributions"); Victor
Brudney, Association,Advocacy, and the FirstAmendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.L. 1, 14 (1995)
(distinguishing private organizations from government, "formed in order to ... represent the whole
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has been suggested, in the direction of treating union members as if they
were taxpayers."
The Court's unwillingness to take seriously this concern of dissenting
taxpayers has been criticized. Justice Stevens' dissent in League of Woman
Voters" characterized as "plainly legitimate and significant.. . the Government's interest in minimizing the use of taxpayer monies to promote private
views with which the taxpayers may disagree."16 The Court's recent upholding of the "decency" standard, albeit in a much diluted form, may, at
least temporarily, have assuaged objecting taxpayers and their representatives."1 Even so, the concern about "decency" does not necessarily exhaust
the range of possible objections."
One practical response to the problem of taxpayers who object to government funding of the arts, or at least of some particular artistic endeavors,
would be to fund these programs on the same basis as the public funding of
presidential campaigns, that is, through a check-off on the income tax. This
also might be a useful approach to the equally controversial funding by the
federal government of public broadcasting through the Corporation For
Public Broadcasting (CPB). 3' Under this proposal, the amount that Congress
would appropriate for the arts or the CPB could not exceed the amount that
the nation's taxpayers collectively volunteered to spend.
C. Tax DollarsProvide Forafor Private Expression

When government provides a forum to a private party without requiring fair market value payment for the forum's use, the government is to that
society and deal with all its problems," and "subject to the restrictions on [its] power to act, including
the a power to speak").
34. Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in
Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 3, 23-24 (1983); David B. Gaebler, FirstAmendment
Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1019

(1982).
35. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408 (1984).

36. Id. at 414-15 n.7.
37. See Jacqueline Prescott, Funding America's Creativity: NEA's Ivey Pushes for Support,

Sept. 18, 1998, at C7 ("agency has been taken off the critical list, moving out of the
cross hairs of the Republican leadership that two years ago sought to eliminate it").
38. In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, (1987), the Court struck down a
state sales tax that taxed general interest magazines, but exempted, and thus subsidized, newspapers and
religious, professional, trade, and sports journals. In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that
WASHINGTON POST,

Perhaps a more stringent, prophylactic rule is appropriate, and can consistently be
applied, when the subsidy pertains to the expression of a particular viewpoint on a
matter of political concern-a tax exemption, for example, that is expressly available only to publications that take a particular point of view on a controversial issue
of foreign policy.
Id. at 237 (Scalia J., dissenting).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1994).
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extent subsidizing that party's speech.' Yet, the First Amendment itself has

been held to require that government make so-called traditional public
fora-the streets, sidewalks, parks-available to all speakers, subject to
only reasonable time, place, and manner limits." Traditional public fora are
normally made available with little or no charge. It remains unclear whether
the First Amendment permits the government to choose to impose a flat

user fee on prospective speakers.41 Even if permissible, the fee would in all
probability have to relate to defraying the incremental costs produced by the
particular use of the forum, rather than the reasonable market value of such
use.
Yet, assuming a valid theoretical basis for an "opt-out" possibility for
taxpayers objecting to the government's funding of private expression, this
would not necessarily extend to the use of public fora. First, most public
fora, the streets and sidewalks for example, are primarily designed, funded,
and constructed to serve a non-communicative purpose, and are used only

incidentally for First Amendment activity. Thus, any subsidization of expression does not stem from the actual expenditure of tax dollars as much as
from the loss of revenue that could be generated by charging a reasonable
fee. More importantly, to the extent that the First Amendment itself compels
free access to public fora for purposes of engaging expression, there is no

basis for complaint by dissenting taxpayers.
III.

GOVERNMENT COMPELS DIRECT SUBSIDIZATION OR FACILITATION OF
"PRIVATE" EXPRESSION

A. Subsidization Through Payment of Money
Labor unions and integrated bars arguably perform quasi-governmental
or public functions.' Unions are authorized to engage in collective bar-

40. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (referring to traditional public fora as involving
"the existence of a Government 'subsidy,' in the form of Government-owned property"). At least in the
realm of mass public transportation, it is commonplace to charge advertisers for the right to display their
messages on public buses and subways. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
41. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
42. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992) (invalidating for lack of
articulated standards an ordinance permitting a county official to impose a charge for the extra expenses,
such as law enforcement and clean up, that the county might incur in providing the use of a public forum).
43. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R_ Co., 323 U.S. 192, 206 (1944) construing federal labor laws
to oblige labor union to represent interest of black as well as white members, especially Justice Murphy's concurrence, addressing the constitutional issue. Id. at 208-09. See Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some
Thoughts on the Puzzle ofState Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 663, 717 (1995). In Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the Court summarized the "guidelines" to be followed "in determining
which activities a union constitutionally may charge to dissenting employees," stating that "chargeable
activities must (1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's
vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the bur-
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gaining as a means of preserving labor peace. Integrated bars are permitted
to participate in the formulation and enforcement of standards of professional conduct to ensure that attorneys, as officers of the court, play a proper
role in the administration of justice. To this extent, the money that government requires be paid to such organizations resembles taxes used to fund
communication inherent in the performance of the government's vital functions," and there is no First Amendment right to withhold support.5
The decision in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott,Inc.16 rejected
a First Amendment challenge, by objecting fruit growers, to federal marketing orders requiring them to fund an advertising campaign promoting
consumption of agricultural products. The functioning of an agricultural
marketing cooperative, including promotion of agricultural commodities, is
quasi-governmental. 7 If this is the implicit rationale, however, then even if
the objecting growers could have established that they disagreed with the
"views" expressed in some of the advertising, there would have been no
right to object." This is because the function of promoting the fruits is like
providing collective bargaining representation in Abood, or governing the
bar as in Keller."
But when these organizations spend dues to advance positions on what,
under the FCC's now rescinded fairness doctrine,-- would have been
deemed "controversial issues of public importance," they are no longer acting in a quasi-governmental capacity and no longer enjoy any special status.
The reasons for which the government gave them such status are inapplicable. Therefore, at this point, although private organizations have the First
dening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop." Id. at 518.
44. This is valid communication even under my view as to the limits the First Amendment places on
advocacy by the government.
45. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (government's interest sufficiently
strong so that all in group may be required to contribute to performance of the function).
46. 117 S, Ct. 2130 (1997). See Dave Smith, Note, Forced Advertising: Free Speech or Not Even?
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 779 (1997).
47. Justice Souter's dissent, referring to the Court's decisions involving labor unions and the organized bar, spoke of the "freedom from compulsion to subsidize speech and other expressive activities
undertaken by private and quasi-private organizations." Glickrman, 117 S. Ct. at 2144.
The Glickman majority opinion did not even see the case as raising a serious First Amendment
issue. The opinion perceived the case as involving only a "policy judgment" so that the program's "debatable features [were] insufficient to warrant special First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 2141.
48. The majority opinion noted that it was "fair to presume that [the growers] agree with the central
message of the speech," id. at 2138, and that any "disagreement with particular messages" had "no
bearing on the validity of the entire program." Id. at 2137.
49. Thus, the majority readily concluded that the disputed "non-ideological expenditures" fell on the
valid side of the standard applied in Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14, and Le/mert, 500 U.S. at 518 for identifying those collective expenditures that dissenting members may be compelled to pay. Glickman, 117 S.
Ct. at 2140. See Smith, supra note 46 at 793 (suggesting that "the generic advertising portion of the
marketing orders.., would have a good chance of surviving scrutiny" under the Lehnert standards).
50. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049; 63 R.R.2d 541(1987), af'd, Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1989).
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Amendment right to speak-for example, the right "to endorse or advance a
gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative,"" the government may not

compel their members to subsidize such speech.
B. Subsidization Through UncompensatedProvisionofa Forum
As previously noted, when government provides a forum without requiring payment, this is a form of subsidization. In Marsh v. Alabama," the
Court held that the First Amendment required even a nominally private
party to provide access to a forum." Typically, however, the government
elects to require a private party to provide a forum, for example, in the

regulation of cable operators or broadcasters. Where the law or regulation
does not provide for compensation, this is similar to a so-called "unfunded

mandate,"' 4' the equivalent of imposing a tax. The requirement that cable
operators "must carry" certain over-the-air stations is an example of this."
C. FacilitationThrough CompensatedProvision of a Forum
There are instances where the government compels access on a compensated basis-where there is no compelled subsidization. For example,

federal law requires cable operators to provide several "leased access"
channels to independent programmers" and requires broadcasters to provide

"reasonable access" at (normal) rates to candidates for elective office." The
Fifth Amendment does not safeguard the discretion of a property owner

against compulsion by government to sell or lease.-" Rather, government, or
its private delegee, may take property for a "public purpose," provided it

pays "just compensation," that is, fair market value. 9

51. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990).
52. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
53. Id. at 509. The Court held that for constitutional purposes a so-called company town owned by a
corporation was public, so that the First Amendment rights of its residents while on town property were
protected against corporate interference. After Marsh, the Court embraced, but ultimately rejected a
similar analysis as applied to privately owned shopping centers. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
519-20 (1976).
54. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,2 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.
55. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (1994). See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (hereinafter Turner
I/), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (sustaining rules as applied to carriage of commercial stations).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1994).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994). The constitutionality of this requirement was sustained inCBS,
Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,396-97 (1981).
58. See Richard H. Seamon, Separationof Powers and the Separate Treatment of ContractClaims
Against theFederalGovernmentfor Specific Performance,43 VILL. L. REv. 155, 210-11 (1998).
59. See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987), involving the Pole Attachment Act,
which did not require the utility to lease its poles to a cable company, but just regulated rates at which
poles could be leased. The Court distinguished between "a commercial lessee and an interloper with a
government license," and stated that it did not decide the issue of FCC-required access. See also Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that requiring a landlord to
install a cable company's equipment on the landlord's building is a taking).
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Thus, even if the "leased access" and "reasonable access" provisions
would amount to a so-called "taking" for a "public purpose," they satisfy
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment by reason of the payments required
of the program producers and the candidates. Even with compensation, the
First Amendment concern remains. There is the continuing impingement on
the decisionmaking power of the affected party who, for reasons sufficient
to itself, might have elected to refrain from leasing a channel to a particular
programmer or providing access to candidates." Recall that in Tornillo,
which invalidated a requirement that a political candidate attacked in a
newspaper's editorial be given space to reply, the candidate desiring to
make the reply did not have to pay for access. Assume, however, that the
Florida law at issue instead were like the federal "reasonable access" requirements for broadcasters. Given the Court's focus on the impairment of
the newspaper's "editorial discretion," it is improbable that this modification would have changed the result.
IV. TRIGGERING STRICT SCRUTINY OF COMPELLED EXPRESSION

A. Government's Substitution of Its Choice for That of the Regulated Party
("EditorialDiscretion ")

First Amendment values are implicated in all of the above scenarios,
yet, they present many variables. There is, however, one consistent and
critical element: Government is substituting its choice for that of the regulated party. Whether government is determining the content of a publication, parade, or programming on a broadcasting station or a cable system,
paying taxes or dues, providing space on a vehicle, or administering a shopping mall, the key element for First Amendment analysis is that government
intervention deprives a party of a choice on whether to subsidize and/or
otherwise facilitate the creation and/or dissemination of expression.
At times, the Court has emphasized the choice exercised by one category of communicators, the so-called "editorial discretion" of the mass media.62 But "editorial discretion" is synonymous for the same kind of choice

60. Note that where the government has compelled access without compensation, the affected party
has claimed a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robbins, 447 U.S. 74,82-84 (1980) (rejecting takings argument).
61. See Century Fed., Inc. v. Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1552, 1554-55 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
62. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666-68 (1990) (noting the "unique role of media corporations," in course of
upholding constitutionality of a state law that forbade corporate independent expenditures in support of
state political candidates, but exempted "media corporations"); Leathers v. Wedlock, 499 U.S. 439, 443
(1991) (noting that cable television "is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press."'); Denver Area
concurring in judgEduc. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 813 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
ment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing editorial discretion and objecting to applying varying
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as was protected in Barnette.0 And once having accepted the "editorial discretion" of the mass media, there was no satisfactory way of differentiating
such choice from that of other businesses. Thus, in Pacific Gas & Electric
Company v. Public Utility Commission," the Court recognized the discretion of a non-media corporation, a public utility, to determine what additional material to include in the envelope within which it disseminated a
newsletter to its customers.63 Later, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group ofBoston,16 upholding the right of the organizers of
a parade to choose its participating organizations and thereby "to exclude
the message it did not like," the Court stated that the right "to shape ...
expression" is not "restricted to the press, being enjoyed by business corporations generally.... .", The point, the Court concluded, "is simply to shield
those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful." As discussed below, the element of governmental interference with
choice in expression should ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny without reference to several other factors that the Court now weighs in assessing a compelled expression claim.
B. Nature of the Compulsion-Content/ViewpointNeutral vs. Content/Viewpoint Specific
The government's compelling a party to speak or to subsidize/facilitate
the speech of others should be strictly scrutinized, regardless of whether the
compulsion is viewpoint or content-based. Yet, in analyzing compelled expression cases, the Court, as in almost all decisions involving limitations on
speech, has deemed it critical to determine whether the government has
imposed a viewpoint- or content-based requirement and has held that strict
review must be applied only where such a basis is found."1
The assumption that the analytical framework governing restrictions of

degrees of First Amendment protection to different mass media).
63. The Court also vindicated such choice when it held in Wooley that a New Hampshire motorist
could not be required to display the state's motto-Live Free Or Die-on the license plates affixed to his
car. It was not suggested that the motorist was otherwise involved in disseminating information via
displays on his car (perhaps through bumper stickers). This was a pure compelled subsidization case
involving the uncompensated provision of a forum, that is, the car. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977).
64. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
65. 1d. at 20-21. Pacific Gas may well have had a larger "audience" than a local cable company. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that media
and non-media corporations were entitled to equal First Amendment rights).
66. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
67. Id. at 574.
68. Id.
69. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC
(Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). The Court has emphasized that the compulsion in both Tornillo
and PacificGas were content-based. Id. at 653-54.
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speech should strictly carry over to compelled expression is questionable.,
Of course, viewpoint and content-based compulsions raise obvious First
Amendment concerns like those in cases involving restrictions on speech."
But this does not mean that strict review of compelled expression must be
confined to such cases. There may be additional concerns that warrant a
broader application of strict review.
Consider a few examples. What if, in Tornillo, the state had simply
provided that in communities with only one daily paper, the paper would be
required to have an opinion-editorial page in which opinion pieces from the
public had to be published on a first-come, first-served basis? There would
arguably have been no triggering content-related event. Of course, the requirement that the published pieces express opinions could be considered, in
an attenuated way, a content-based restriction.7n But within the Court's current analytical framework, there would be no overt censorial concern and
thus no persuasive reason to apply strict review. Nevertheless, there is little
doubt that the Court would have reached the same result as in the actual
case.

What if the requirement in Tornillo were recast to mandate a "public
access page," further diminishing the "content-related" concern? Or consider a requirement that specified, without regard to content, that a newspaper add three additional pages. 4 This requirement would be consistent with
70. See Gaebler, supra note 34, at 1009.
71. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a law allowing picketing of a
school, but only as to labor disputes). Of course, the line between content- and non-content-based restrictions can be highly problematic and subjective, as demonstrated by the discussion in Turner L, 512
U.S. at 642 ("[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always
a simple task"). See John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 113 -14 (1996).
The Court's concern that content-based compulsions induce self-censorship (Turner , 512 U.S.
at 654) seems somewhat speculative especially if one considers that in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), the Court found the very same point unpersuasive as to the alleged effects of the fairness doctrine. Of course, in its 1985 FairnessReport, the FCC adopted this point (based largely on selfserving comments of broadcasters) in the course of concluding that the doctrine was no longer justified.
Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations ConcerningGeneral Fairness
Obligationsof BroadcastLicensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 58 R.R.2d 1137 (1985).
72. In League of Women Voters, the Court determined that a prohibition on "editorializing" was
content-based, that is, that an editorial, was a genre of speech. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364,383 (1984).
73. In the course of holding that the FCC lacked statutory authority to impose access requirements
on cable companies, the Court, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video Ii), 440 U.S. 689 (1979),
noted the substantial First Amendment problems that such compelled access would raise. Id. at 705 n. 14,
709 n.19. These First Amendment problems had been discussed by the court of appeals. Midwest Video
Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1053-57 (8th Cir. 1978).
74. In United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649 (1972), the Court held
that the FCC was empowered to require cable companies to originate programming (including studio
requirements etc). Apparently, no consideration was given to the argument that this was a compelled
speech case. In fact, the emphasis was on furthering First Amendment values by adding to the programming available to viewers. Id at 667-669 & 668 n.27.
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maintaining "editorial discretion" in the sense that the newspaper could
decide what to put in the three pages. But is not part of editorial discretion,
presumably protected by the First Amendment, the ability to decide what
not to publish?"
The application of strict review to compelled expression that is not
overtly viewpoint- or content-based would likely lead to the invalidation of
additional regulations-such as the cable "must carry" requirements-that
are at least arguably enlightened promotions of the public interest. Such a
semi-absolutist approach, making superfluous the extensive discussion in
Turner I aimed at determining whether the "must carry" regulations were

content-based,7'6 would apply the First Amendment as a prophylactic measure. The approach, contrary to the thrust of First Amendment thinking that
emphasizes the value of regulation in furtherance of First Amendment values," reflects a distrust of democratic government's regulation of speech in
free speech values.

Even without overt viewpoint- or content-based regulation, the risks of
de facto favoritism by government, and the consequent threat to First
Amendment values, may well outweigh the arguable benefits that could

flow from such regulation." Moreover, while in the field of economic regulation, current constitutional doctrine tolerates the well known problems of

unintended consequences, the critical role of the First Amendment in maintaining the democratic process makes more problematic the risk of such
consequences in the regulation of speech.

75. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1975) (invalidating campaign expenditure limits as an
unjustified though content neutral restriction on "the quantity of campaign speech by individuals,
groups, and candidates"). But see Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d
1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990) (upholding municipal rule requiring cable
franchise to originate local programming).
76. At the least, since the question in Turner I was that close, any doubt should have been resolved
in favor of finding a content-based restriction, and therefore not applying the intermediate standard of
review obtained from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). But see C. Edwin Baker, Turner
Broadcasting Content-Based Regulation of Personsand Presses, 1994 S. CT. REV. 57, 82 (endorsing
Turner Il's "sensible result," upholding the must-carry rules, but disputing the Court's focus on whether
there was content-based regulation, since the "Court's individual choice notion of the 'heart' of free
speech does not support objections to content-motivated structural regulation of media enterprises").
77. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 46-92, 107-114 (1993).
But see Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 225 (1992).
78. One is reminded of certain tax legislation, where facially neutral provisions are designed to assist
favored interests. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Goodfor General Motors:
Corporate Speech and The Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 240 (1998);
McGinnis, supra note 71, at 114 ("[slpecial rules targeted at the operations or structure of the communication media inevitably affect content, even if they do not expressly refer to it"). It is interesting in this
regard to compare the present First Amendment jurisprudence, with dual levels of scrutiny, to that applied in cases involving a woman's constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. There, the level of
scrutiny applied does not vary with the government's reasons for a challenged regulation.
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C. State of "Mind" of the Party Subject to Compulsion
As just discussed, the fundamental principle governing compelled expression should be the strong presumption that participation in the "system
of freedom of expression" must be free of government compulsion. Yet,
another strand in the Court's compelled speech cases emphasizes the extent,
if any, to which the coerced party disagrees with the disseminated views. '
Several commentators have focused on this strand in arguing that less First
Amendment protection should be accorded to the expressive choices of corporations, which, as legal constructs are themselves incapable of disagree-

ing with anything.8' But state of mind is a make-weight factor in the Court's
analysis. ,,
Under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, a person may
not be compelled to support his or her own church, much less another's.12
Admittedly, there is a compelling historical basis for this position in the
realm of religion. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that the Buckley Court
would have upheld a requirement that during a presidential election, each
person must contribute to the candidate or party of his or her choice.
Of course, where a party is compelled to utter, display, subsidize, or

facilitate an opposed political or religious message, the government's action
is especially objectionable. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court would
allude to such disagreement where it exists. Certainly, however, consistent
with Barnette, the flag salute could not be imposed on a student who ad-

mitted to agreeing with the sentiments in the pledge of allegiance, but simply did not want to recite it, that is, chose not to make his or her sentiments
public.'3 Nor is it reasonable to suppose that after Wooley, a motorist could

79. In Glickman, the majority opinion emphasized that the case was not comparable to those "in
which an objection rested on political or ideological disagreement with the content of the message."
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2140 (1997).
80. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 76, at 82; Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 735, 820-22 (1995); Harpaz, supra note 5, at 902; Mitchell C. Tilner, Government Compulsion of
Corporate Speech: Legitimate Regulation or FirstAmendment Violation? A Critique ofPG&E v. Public
Utilities Commission, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 485, 503 (1987). But see Redish & Wasserman, supra
note 78, at 94.
81. Glicknan, 117 S.Ct. at 2148 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1968) (relying on historical context of religion clauses);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
83. Justice Jackson's opinion observed that "the issue as we see it [does not] tum on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held." West Virginia Bd. Of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943). Of course, compelling a student to learn
the pledge and, perhaps,
to demonstrate his or her knowledge by citing it would raise a different issue. See Mozert v. Hawkings
Cty. Bd. Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cit. 1987) cert. denied 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (observing that
in Barnett students were "not merely made acquainted" with the flag salute so that they might be informed as to what it is or even what it means); Cf.Abington Sch. Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963) (distinguishing between bible reading as a religious exercise versus a program of study about
religion).
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be compelled to display a state's motto as long as he or she agreed with, or
was at least neutral as to its sentiment. In fact, as noted by Justice Souter's
Glickman dissent," in Hurley, the Court stressed that the principle of
choice--that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech-"applies not
only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement," as to which the
speaker's agreement or disagreement would pertain, "but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.""
D. Extent to Which CoercedParty is Likely to be Identified with the Subsidized Speech
In Hurley, the Court rejected an analogy to the must-carry rules sustained in Turner II on the ground that "a parade, unlike a cable system, is
not a mere 'conduit' that is unlikely to be identified with the speech it carries."'" But the consideration that a party may be identified with the speech
that is governmentally compelled (either in the sense that third-parties may
reasonably assume such identification or that the coerced person reasonably
may feel that he or she is so identified) is again a make-weight. There are
indeed circumstances where adverse consequences may befall someone who
is publicly identified as supporting an unpopular viewpoint." Moreover,
there is the consideration that a party has an interest in not being misidentified as having a particular viewpoint, that is, maintaining an identity or persona.n
Nevertheless, in the previously discussed hypothetical about compelled
contributions to a political campaign or candidate favored by the contributor, would the requirement be any more valid if total confidentiality were
maintained, even to the extent that the candidate or political party receiving
the compelled support would not be informed of its source? Again, the central point is that compelled subsidization is objectionable even if there is no
identification between the contributor and the subsidized expression. That is
why it is irrelevant that the party, whose support is compelled, may have the

84. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2148.

85. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 US. 557, 573 (1995) (citing
Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995)); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind

of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1988).
86, 574 U.S. at 576-77. See also Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2139, noting that "[tihe use of assessments
to pay for advertising" did not "require he objecting growers] to be publicly identified or associated
with another's message." (citing PruncYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)). But see
Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2147 (Souter J., dissenting) (suggesting "the principle that [any protected
speech] is outside the government's power to coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further

justification.").
87. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1,74 (1975).
88. See Gaebler, supra note 34, at 1010. interestingly, a corporation, perhaps as much as a human
being, has a strong interest in disassociating from views that its managers consider will detract from the
image of the corporation that they have sought to fosters or will alienate its customers.
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available option of clarifying a disagreement with the message being disseminated. Thus, the point made by Justice Rehnquist in Wooley, that the

objecting party simply could have displayed his own message on his car to
properly disclaim support for the state's message, , did not persuade the
Court.
E. Nature of the Compelled Expression
Justice Souter's dissent in Glickman reads the majority opinion as

holding that the Court's compelled expression decisions apply to only political or ideological speech.- Although the Court does differentiate Glick-

man, in part on the basis of the non-ideological character of the
advertising,"1 this reading is probably exaggerated. Nevertheless, Justice
Souter properly replies that "nothing in those cases suggests that the government has free rein to compel funding of nonpolitical speech" (which

might include art, for example, as well as commercial advertising).9
The concern as to the nature of the compelled expression relates more
to the standard of review that should be applied in cases involving pro-

tected, but nonpolitical, speech. The primary focus is commercial speech.
Justice Souter's Glickman dissent argued that "laws requiring an individual
to engage in or pay for expressive activities are reviewed under the same
standard that applies to laws prohibiting one from engaging in or paying for

such activities.""' The standard of review that should be applied in a compelled expression case that involves any expression that enjoys First
Amendment protection should not, however, depend on a judgment as to its

relative value. The important factor is that the party's liberty to refrain from
speaking or subsidizing is curtailed.' The analysis, however, with respect to

imposition of various disclosure requirements, such as those relating to
product hazards and contents, is different.
The principal rationale for applying First Amendment protection to
89. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (1977) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting). Similarly, in PruneYard, it should not have been persuasive that the owner of the shopping mall was unlikely to have been
identified with the anti-war message of the demonstrators. PruneYard Shopping Center,447 U.S. at 88.
90. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2147 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2140.
92. Id.
at 2147 (Souter, J., dissenting). The public indecency statute at issue in Barnes v. Glen Theaire, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) could be regarded as involving compelled artistic expression. Inits application to bar nude dancing as an art form by requiring that the dancers wear minimal coverings, the
statute arguably compelled an addition to the ideas and emotions the dancers wished to convey.
93. Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at2149 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Thus, in concluding that the compelled
subsidization was invalid, he applied the less rigorous commercial speech standard of CentralHudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
94. One commentator recently has argued for the elimination of the separate Central Hudson standard for determining whether a regulation of commercial speech is valid. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap
Spirits, Cigarettes,and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 S. CT. REV. 123.
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commercial speech is that the speech provides useful information upon
which the consumer can make an informed decision. 5 Deceptive commer-

cial speech has no such benefit and, consequently, enjoys no First Amendment protection." The truth or falsity of such speech is thought to be objectively determinable, and government may require that misleading speech be
corrected by additional speech. 97 Such compelled disclosure is consistent
with the consumer autonomy rationale for protecting commercial speech in
the first place. In virtually every case, the regulated party has already chosen to speak, even if minimally, regarding the offered product or service.

Given the utilitarian rationale for according First Amendment protection
against curtailment of commercial speech, it is difficult to discern any rationale for preserving a right against compelled disclosure where necessary
to prevent the consumer from being misled."s Also, the compelled speech, in
the sense of disclosure of material facts, often serves the important if not

compelling interest in safety."
By contrast, the validity of the disclosure requirement upheld in Meese
v. Keene---that exhibitors of certain foreign films (here Canadian films

relating to environmental issues) had to disclose that the Department of Justice had determined the films to be "political propaganda" in that they were
political and were distributed by "agents" of "foreign principals"--is far
from clear.'0' In the Court's view, "Congress simply required the dissemi95. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun. Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-65
(1976); CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
96. Virginia Pharm. Bd,425 U.S. at 771; CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563. Compare with Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (false promises by political candidate may not be made actionable).
97. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 656 (1985) (upholding requirement that attorneys who advertise availability of representation on a contingent fee basis disclose method
of calculating such fees). But see Ibanez v. Florida Dep't. of Bus. and Prof]I Regulation, 512 U.S. 136,
146-47 (1994) (invalidating disclosure requirement because danger that public would be misled was only
"hypothetical"); International Dairy Foods Ass'n v.Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying Central Hudson standards to invalidate Vermont law requiring labeling of products from cows treated with
growth hormone).
98. See Caren Schmulen Sweetland, Note, The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Dangers ofExtending FirstAmendment Protectionto Commercial Disclosure Requirements, 76 TEX. L.
REV.471, 501-04 (1997).
99. In PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992), the Court upheld as "reasonable licensing and regulation by the state," a requirement that a physician "provide information about the risks of abortion, and child birth, in a manner mandated by the State." One commentator, distinguishing the ordinary commercial disclosure eases, has suggested "that Casey and current First Amendment doctrine have underestimated the substantial individual and societal interests in
the physician's free speech." Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Process,4 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. L.J. 787, 854 (1996).
100. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
101. The stated objective was "to protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations
of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities and
other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign principals so that the Government and the people of the United States may be informed of the identity of
such persons and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities." Meese, 481 U.S. at 469.
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nators of such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda."' ' But the Court's
reliance on this Virginia Pharmacy Board" "more information is better"
rationale was overly simplistic. Only commercial speech-price information--was there at issue, whereas communication about the origin and nature of a film or book is closely connected to and may adversely affect non-

commercial communication."0
F. The Government's Having Elected to Confer a "Monopolistic" Position
on the Partyit Seeks to Regulate

In Pacific Gas, Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued that because Pacific
Gas was a corporation and a regulated public utility, and not a part of the
institutional media, it should not enjoy "negative free speech rights."' The

fact that a corporation has statutorily conferred advantages should not, however, generally determine the extent to which it enjoys protection against
compelled expression, in particular the level of scrutiny to be applied.'
Although corporate status, as with other property rights, does confer certain
advantages, these advantages are generally available. There is not a certain
number of authorized corporations, after which no other group of investors
may incorporate.

Unlike Pacific Gas's corporate status, the fact that the utility enjoyed a
governmentally-conferred monopolistic status, with regulation by a commission being substituted for competition, should have altered the result. 0'

102. Id. at 480-81.
103. Id. at 481-82.
104. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), (invalidating state law prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 74, 85 (1988) (invalidating state law requiring charitable solicitors to disclose "fundraiser's
profit). In Riley, the Court rejected the application of Virginia Pharmacy Bd. because the Court "d[id]
not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech." Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. The Court stressed that "[o]ur lodestars in
deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken
as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon." Id.
105. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,33-35 (1986). He further relied on
the pragmatic rationale of Bellotti, that corporate speech deserves protection only because it contributes
to the marketplace of ideas. Id.
106. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 76.
107. Later, in Hurley, the Court distinguished the case of the cable companies in Turner I and 11 on
the ground that cable is "a franchised channel giving monopolistic opportunity to shut out some speakers." Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995). "This
power," the Court asserted, "gives rise to the Government's interest in limiting monopolistic autonomy
in order to allow for the survival of broadcasters who might otherwise be silenced and consequently
destroyed." Id. See also Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656. Aside from any questions as to whether a monopoly
actually was conferred (see Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2738 (1994) (holding unconstitutional the city's granting of a de facto
monopoly cable franchise); Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (prohibiting prospectively the granting of exclusive franchises)), it is worth noting
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The Court previously had held that such monopolistic status does not turn a
private public utility into a governmental actor for purposes of state action
analysis."' Nevertheless, as with a labor union or an integrated bar, the traditional monopolistic public utility at least partakes of a quasi-governmental
character. The material, relating to opposition to a rate increase, that the
Public Utility Commission required Pacific Gas to disseminate, directly
bore on implementation of the regulatory process necessitated by the utility's monopoly.
Thus, contrary to the argument in Justice Powell's plurality opinion,
the Court's prior holding that a public utility generally enjoyed the First
Amendment right to participate in the marketplace of ideas, should not have
been determinative.' Justice Powell pointed out that the Court's ruling,
under the concededly valid requirement of the securities laws that a corporation's management must include in proxy statements the proposals of dissident shareholders, concerned only the internal governance of the corporation, not the corporation's communications with the general public as a participant in the marketplace of ideas.", But the close nexus of the compelled
expression to regulation of the utility's governmentally sanctioned monopoly status should have made it unnecessary to apply more than an intermediate level of scrutiny to the Commission's requirement. In that sense, as
pointed out in Justice Stevens' dissent,"' the requirement differed from a
general restraint on the utility's expression and indeed was analogous to that
mandated under the securities laws.
PruneYard,holding that government may require the owner of a shopping mall to allow its property to be used for political speech, is a second
case which might better be anaylzed in terms of the government's conferring monopolistic benefits on the regulated party. Prior to PruneYard,the
Court had rejected the state action argument that the First Amendment required a private shopping mall to be operated as a traditional public
forum."2 But as the proponents of finding state action in the shopping mall
cases had emphasized, the government provided substantial benefits-zoning changes, new access roads, sewers, and related infrastructure."' These

that in Turner 1,while the federal government was imposing the compulsion, it was not the franchisor.
108. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
109. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1986) (citing Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.1 (1980), where the Court
determined that the utility's status "as a privately owned but government regulated monopoly [did not]
preclude its assertion of First Amendment rights" to express its "opinions or viewpoints on controversial
issues of public policy" Id. at 531).
110. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 14 n. 10.
111. Id. at 39-40.

112. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
113. Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 575-77 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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were specifically designed and intended to enable the shopping mall to be
built, with the almost inevitable effect of replacing the community's traditional commercial downtown shopping area. Moreover, unlike the provision of a traditional public forum, the government's provision of these benefits was voluntary. Thus, in PruneYard, it is not so much the factors identified by Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and Powell's concurrence that compelled the result. Rather, assuming circumstances comparable
to those in Lloyd, one could better analyze the decision in terms of the government (state and municipality) having conditioned the receipt of benefits,

in particular favorable zoning with monopolistic implications, upon the
shopping mall's operation as a public forum."'
Red Lion, emphasizing the "scarcity" of the electromagnetic
spectrum"' to justify licensing requirements constraining the editorial discretion of broadcasters,"' is another instance in which the government's
conferring a monopolistic benefit may offer a more persuasive rationale for
the court's ultimate conclusion. It was recently suggested that one might

consider the grant of a license to be the conferral of a benefit by the government, that is, the reasonable market value of the license, that justifies

applying a more lenient standard of review to such requirements. ' 7 The
more critical aspect, however, is that the government has conferred a monopolistic degree of control over a type of government property, a limited

public forum."'

114. One could also focus on the strong, perhaps compelling interest of the government in maintaining the open character of such shopping malls that largely replaced the traditional downtown shopping
areas (effectively the same kind of balancing that went into the Marsh state action decision). See Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 317-19 (1968). The interests that dictate
that the government may not limit the use of a traditional public forum; that is, that it is required to
subsidize or at least facilitate expressive activities occurring in such fora, apply to regulation of what is,
for practical purposes, a substitute private forum-a private shopping mall.
115. This scarcity flows from the laws of physics and from the fact that the government has divided
up the spectrum according to various uses.
116. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969). The most recent example of such a
requirement, although couched in terms of a license renewal guideline, is the FCC's implementation of
the Children's Television Act of 1990 [hereinafter CTA], Pub. L. No. 101437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990), 47
USCA §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (1994). See Policies And Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, 11 F.C.C.Rcd. 10660 (1996) (authorizing FCC's Mass Media Bureau to find broadcaster in compliance with CTA's requirements if broadcaster meets Commission's guideline of three hours of children's programming per week).
117. Time Warner Entertainment Co., v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J.,
dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
118. See Kamenshine, supra note 13, at 1142-43 (analyzing a broadcast license as the government's
having conferred on a private entity a monopolistic control over a public forum); Charles W. Logan, Jr.,
Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation,
1997 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1732-38, 1754-65 (distinguishing between the public forum and the quidpro
quo rationales for regulation and suggesting that the public forum doctrine is the best vehicle for assessing the validity of broadcast regulation). Professor and former FCC Commissioner, Glen 0. Robinson,
points out, however, that "[slaying that the government owns 'property' in the spectrum is simply a way
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What difference does it make if spectrum is auctioned off as mandated
by recent legislation?'19 Once the government sells the "property," it has
been suggested that the scarcity rationale of Red Lion may vanish. 10 The
property conceptualization, however, may suggest that even with a sale, the
government may explicitly, or even implicitly, reserve certain "easements;"
in effect not selling the entire property. For example, if the government
were to sell a parcel of land, it would be entitled to reserve an easement
whereby public access to a historical or scenic site might be preserved. As
with the sale of any property, the purchase price would be reduced by the
reasonable value of what the seller, here the government, has reserved.
A somewhat different conceptualization involves the suggestion that
the reduction in price may represent an alternative form of subsidy. More
specifically, with respect to the requirement that a Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS) provider bear some of the operating costs and overhead as to channels reserved for educational programming, it was pointed out that "the differential--money that the government could have received had it not imposed the programming requirement-constitutes a subsidy exactly matching the pecuniary burden imposed by the provision." This may well entitle
the government to impose such requirements on the purchaser.' 2'
V. CONCLUSION

Barnette indeed presented the most compelling case for invalidating
compelled expression. In deciding subsequent cases, the Court has alluded
to many factors. But its approach lacks coherence. The fundamental principle, still applicable to the more subtle and complex problems of today, is the
strong presumption that participation in the "system of freedom of expression" should be voluntary. Strict review of compelled expression, including
compelled subsidization and/or facilitation of a third party's expression,
should be the general rule. Government should rely on avenues other than
compelled expression to enhance the market place of ideas.
As for government speech and government subsidization of private

of describing the governments' control of the uses of radio frequencies, in space, in order to prevent
what the common lawyer might call a nuisance and an economist would call an 'externality."' Glen 0.
Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: an Essayfor the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899,912(1998).
119. Pub. L. 105-33, Title III, §§ 3002(a)(1)to (3), 3003, 111 Stat. 258, 260(Aug. 5, 1997), 47 U.S.C.
3090).
120. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT 542 n.98, 545 n.104 (1995); WILLIAM W.
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 87-88 (1984).

dissent from denial of rehearing en banc);
121. See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 728 (Williams, J.,
Logan, supra note 118, at 64. For criticism of current non-scarcity-based theories advanced in support of
regulating the electronic media, see RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC
MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., The Media Institute 1997).
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speech, practicality, not theory, bars recovery by dissenting taxpayers. The
problem is made worse to the extent that the Court first rejects any implied
political establishment limits, and second, out of concern for the rights of
potential grantees, adheres to the view that the First Amendment bars the
extending of grants under standards, such as the "decency" provision, if
meaningfully enforced. Certainly, to reflect the concerns of dissenting taxpayers, Congress should consider restructuring the way in which funding for
grants is determined.
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